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Statutory Preference for Straight-Ticket Voting in Counting
Crossover Baliots-Hendon v. North Carolina State Board
of Elections
The right to vote is a fundamental right.' Inherent in that right is the
constitutional privilege of having one's vote counted in a manner consistent
with the intent with which it was cast.2 In determining how to count an am-
biguous vote, "the object should be to ascertain and to carry into effect the
intention of the voter, if it can be determined with reasonable certainty."' 3
In Hendon v. North Carolina State Board of Elections4 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit examined the constitutionality of a
North Carolina statute declaring that a ballot marked in both a straight-party
circle and in the individual circle of a competing candidate of another party
was to be counted as a straight-party vote.5 The court of appeals determined
that the statute was contrary to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment,6 reversed the district court's decision,7 and remanded the case for
a determination of a counting procedure that would reflect better the intent of
crossover voters.8 The court, however, refused to order a recount of the ballots
cast in the election,9 declaring its decision to be prospective only.10
The Hendon court implied that a counting procedure replacing the one
held unconstitutional could count crossover votes cast for individuals as either
"neutralizing" or "controlling" the straight-party vote for the candidate's op-
ponent. This note examines the merits of each of these counting techniques
and concludes by proposing a "striking" system of vote-counting that com-
bines elements of both methods. The proposed striking system better ensures
that the voter's intent will be counted accurately.
Hendon, an incumbent Republican representing North Carolina's elev-
enth district in the United States House of Representatives, lost a reelection
bid in November 1982 to Clarke, a Democrat. The election was close, with
Clarke receiving 85,410 votes, or 49.93 percent of the total votes cast, and Hen-
1. As the Supreme Court remarked in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964), "No right
is more precious in a free country, .. other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to
vote is undermined."
2. The right to have one's vote counted correctly was afforded constitutional protection in
United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
3. G. MCCRARY, AMERICAN LAW OF ELECTIONS § 530, at 393-94 n.2 (4th ed. 1897).
4. 710 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1983).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-151(5)(b), -170(6)(b) (1982 & Cum. Supp. 1983).
6. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I provides: "No State shall. . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
7. The district court's decision inHendon was not published, but can be found in the Record
at 47.
8. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 183.
9. Hendon, an incumbent Republican, lost his seat in the House of Representatives during
the November 1982 election in North Carolina's Eleventh Congressional District. The results are
described in more detail infra notes 11-17 and accompanying text.
10. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 182.
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don tallying 84,085, or 49.16 percent.1 ' The number of ballots marked for
both Hendon and the straight Democratic party ticket was significant.12 Rec-
ognizing that a recount could swing the election if enough crossover ballots
were counted differently,' 3 Hendon contested the election.
Four methods of voting had been used during the 1982 election in Hen-
don's district-paper ballots, mechanical lever machines, an electronic punch
card system (CES), and an optically scanned paper ballot system (Airmac).14
The counting of the crossover ballots varied among the voting methods. No
crossover ballots existed among the paper ballots because separate congres-
sional ballots, unaffected by straight-party voting, were used. The mechanical
lever machines counted votes in a manner contrary to the statutory require-
ment. The machines counted the specific vote over the general party vote and
gave no readout indicating that a straight ticket ever was voted.' 5 Because
neither of these voting methods adversely affected Hendon, they were not
challenged. The CES and Airmac systems counted the straight-party vote
over contrary individual votes; Hendon challenged the total in the five coun-
ties where they had been used. 16 After being denied a recount, first by all five
county boards of elections and then by the state board on appeal, Hendon filed
11. FEDERAL ELECTIONS 82: OFFICIAL ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. SENATE AND THE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 67 (1982) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL ELECTIONS 82]; Hen-
don, 710 F.2d at 179. A Libertarian candidate received the other 1552 votes. A plurality vote is
sufficient to win a general election for Congressman.
12. Although the total number of votes cast in the election was 171,047, FEDERAL ELECTIONS
82, supra note 11, at 67, the dual ballots would have to have been cast within the challenged areas
of the five disputed counties to have affected the outcome (the total vote within these counties was
31,732 for Clarke, 33,096 for Hendon, and 537 for the Libertarian candidate). Nevertheless, evi-
dence was presented from the Republican observer in one precinct (Boyd) in one of these counties
(Transylvania) that he had "personally observed approximately 150" crossover votes for Hendon
in the 500 ballots rejected by the machine. These ballots later were counted for Clarke when they
were fed into a replacement machine. Record at 77, Hendon. Although no workers in other
precincts observed Hendon crossover votes in numbers approaching 150, none experienced
machine breakdowns as serious as in the Boyd precinct. The one-third ratio was not uncharacter-
istic of that found elsewhere. See, e.g., id. at 81 (12 of 33 observed ballots contained were Hendon
crossovers in Brevard precinct, Transylvania County); id. at 82-83 (two of six were Hendon cross-
overs in Little River precinct). At least six precincts in Transylvania County alone had Hendon
crossover votes observed among machine-rejected ballots. Id. at 105. Because a recount was de-
nied by the court of appeals, however, it never will be known exactly how many dual ballots
existed, or whether the counting method used in 1982 altered the election results. See also infra
note 21.
13. Hendon would have had a plurality vote if 1326 dual ballots were declared void ("neu-
tralized") or if 663 dual ballots were counted in his favor under an "individual vote controls"
method of counting.
14. Each county in North Carolina is free to choose the method of voting to use. N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-161 (1982); H. LEWIS, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA 199 (1982). The
CES method electronically counts votes punched in a card by the voter, while Airmac optically
scans ballot marks made with a special pen. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 179. CES is examined in detail
in Record at 139-40, 155-67, Hendon. Airmac is examined id. at 136, 143-48.
15. Defendant's Brief at 8, Hendon. If Hendon had been granted a recount, Clarke could
have challenged the votes counted by mechanical lever machines as violative of his equal protec-
tion rights. If Clarke were successful, the number of votes voided from Hendon's tally in these
counties could have offset the number Clarke lost in the CES and Airmac counties. Because the
mechanical lever machine did not even indicate crossover ballots, however, such a recount would
be impossible.
16. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 179.
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1983 and 1985 actions 17 in federal district court.
Hendon's claim'8 challenged the constitutionality, both facially and as
applied, of three sections of North Carolina's election statutes. 19 The first sec-
tion required that a ballot marked both generally for straight-party and specif-
ically for individual opposing candidates be counted as if it were purely a
straight-party ballot.20 This "counting" statute was challenged as violative of
the equal protection clause, because its "arbitrary" classifications allegedly
served no legitimate state interest. Hendon argued that the section facially
violated the equal protection rights of voters who did not intend their party
vote to prevail over their individual vote for that particular office. 21 He also
noted that individual write-in votes for candidates on the ballot prevailed over
conflicting straight-party votes, while marked votes for candidates on the bal-
lot did not.22 Finally, Hendon argued that because the crossover ballots were
counted differently in precincts using one type of machine than in precincts
using a different type, the section violated the equal protection clause as ap-
plied to his supporters casting dual ballots in precincts using CES and Airmac
systems.
The second section, which required that split-ticket voters mark each can-
didate individually,23 also was challenged on equal protection grounds. Hen-
don argued that forcing a split-ticket voter to vote individually for every
candidate he desired was facially unconstitutional because it was a statutory
incentive against splitting tickets that unfairly discriminated against crossover
voters, particularly in light of the statutory five minute maximum on voting
when others are waiting. 24 He also argued that this voting procedure was in-
equitably applied in the 1982 elections. In precincts using CES and Airmac
systems, each crossover voter had to vote individually up to fifty-four times to
cast a single crossover vote and vote in every race.2 5 In other precincts, how-
ever, crossover voters merely had to mark their ballot twice--once in the
17. Id. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1976).
18. Hendon was joined in his suit by his campaign committee and a registered voter from the
eleventh district. The suit was filed against the various election boards and their members who
had denied Hendon's recount requests. Clarke, the victorious Democratic candidate, later was
allowed to intervene as a party defendant. Plaintiff's Brief at 2, Hendon.
19. A statute is facially unconstitutional if it is inherently inconsistent with constitutional
tenets, whereas a statute is unconstitutional as applied if, while not facially unconstitutional, it
violates the constitution as it is put into effect in a particular situation.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-170(6)(a), -151(5)(b) (1982).
21. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 181.
22. The anomaly probably grew out of the traditional tendency to view ballots as written
documents, with hand-written statements prevailing over print for purposes of determining intent.
See G. McCRARY, supra note 3, § 543, at 402-03. This distinction was removed after the Hendon
case began; the statute was modified to allow straight-party votes to override all conflicting write-
ins as well. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-170(5)(d)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1983). Another section, id. § 163-
151(6)(d) (1982), reiterates this instruction as it applies to candidates already on the ballot whose
names are written in. Both statutes were declared unconstitutional in Hendon, 710 F.2d at 182.
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-151(5)(a) (1982).
24. Id. § 163-150. The five minute time limit is discussed in greater detail infra notes 98-103
and accompanying text.
25. Plaintiff's Brief at 14, Hendon. The number of individual votes necessary to split a ticket
and vote for all of the offices ranged from a low of 41 to a high of 54 in the disputed counties.
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Democratic circle and once for Hendon. Hendon contended that no compel-
ling state interest justified placing this additional burden on split-ticket voters.
Finally, Hendon alleged that violation of the technical requirements of
North Carolina General Statutes section 163-140 amounted to a denial of due
process.26 The most notable violations were Haydon County's failure to pub-
lish a sample ballot prior to the election 27 and the absence of split-ticket in-
structions printed in "heavy black type" on the CES and Airmac ballots.2 8
Hendon sought three remedies: a declaration that the statutes were unconsti-
tutional; an injunction staying North Carolina's Board of Elections from certi-
fying Clarke as the victorious candidate; and an order for a recount of the
ballots in the regions challenged.2 9
Although the district court in Hendon initially granted a temporary stay
of certification,30 it eventually dissolved the restraining order and dismissed
the case, finding no constitutional infringement. 3 t In an unpublished opin-
ion,32 the court agreed with Hendon that the right to have one's vote counted
fairly is constitutionally protected. 33 Although the court stated that state laws
have a "presumption of validity" against equal protection attacks, 3 4 it agreed
with plaintiff's argument that the proper standard of review should be strict
scrutiny and that encroachment on voting rights can be justified only when a
compelling state interest exists. 35
Despite its agreement with plaintiff on the standards to be applied, the
trial court disagreed with plaintiff as to their application. The court rejected
plaintiff's equal protection arguments and applied the traditional three-part
test, examining the character of the statutory classifications, the individual in-
terests, and the governmental interests involved.3 6 The court did not find the
classifications in the first two statutes (counting and voting procedure) particu-
larly invidious or discriminatory, either facially or as applied. The court sug-
26. See Hendon, 710 F.2d at 182. The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall be...
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
fourteenth amendment precludes such deprivation by states. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
27. Record at 85, Hendon.
28. Plaintiff's Brief at 16-17, Hendon.
29. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 180. Hendon did not assert the second desired form of relief-
injunction against certification-beyond the district court level. Id. at 180 n.3. Hendon did not
ask the courts to determine who had been elected. The Constitution confers that function on the
House of Representatives. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
30. Record at 36, Hendon.
31. The Hendon case moved quickly through the adjudicative system. The election was on
November 2, 1982. After seeking a recount through the elections boards, Hendon received the
temporary stay on November 22. It was dissolved, and Hendon's claim was dismissed by the
district court on December 6. By January 11, 1983, oral arguments were being heard by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit; the decision, however, was not handed
down until June. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 177.
32. Hendon v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, No. A-C-82-357 (W.D.N.C. filed Dec.
6, 1982), reprinted in Record at 47, Hendon, rev'd, 710 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1983).
33. Id., slip op. at 9, reprinted in Record at 55, Hendon.
34. Id., slip op. at 8, reprinted in Record at 54, Hendon.
35. Id., slip op. at 11, reprinted in Record at 57, Hendon.
36. Id., slip op. at 10-1I, reprinted in Record at 56-57, Hendon (citing Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972)).
[Vol. 621176
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
gested that the challenged statutes were not unconstitutionally discriminatory
because, in each separate precinct, the voters were treated alike.37 Further-
more, all voters in the State were charged with a duty to become familiar with
the ballot form and voting procedure before entering a voting booth.38 Even if
the classifications were discriminatory, the court found that a compelling state
interest existed. North Carolina's desire to "permit the voters to vote without
undue delay; to count the votes within a reasonable time and to prevent fraud
and illegal procedures" 39 outweighed any infringement on the expression of
voter intent. The district court rejected the due process argument asserted
against the third statute because it believed that the technical violations in
Hendon constituted "lesser legal wrongs" that did not amount to "patent and
fundamental unfairness." 4 Although the trial court admitted that "valid ar-
guments . . . against the wisdom of the present statutory rule" existed, and
remarked that "if this Court were a member of the General Assembly serious
consideration would be given to voting to repeal" the statute, it concluded that
the statute could not be overturned on constitutional grounds.4 1
The court of appeals unanimously reversed the district court's decision.
Although it agreed with the lower court's statement of the applicable stan-
dards of review, 42 the court of appeals disagreed with its application of these
standards. The appellate court first examined the North Carolina counting
statute and declared its preference for straight-party candidates facially un-
constitutional.43 The court accepted as persuasive precedent two decisions
from other jurisdictions declaring similar statutes unconstitutional. 44 The
Hendon court approved the reasoning of the United States District Court for
the Virgin Islands in Melchoir v. Todman45 that such statutes exhibit a legisla-
tive preference unrelated to voter preference and discriminate unlawfully
against independent candidates. 46 The Hendon court also cited with approval
the following New Hampshire Supreme Court language in Murchie v. Clif-
ford:47 "The legislature may enact the method by which a man shall vote, but
cannot direct how the ballot he casts shall be counted." 48 Stating that no case
37. "All voters in each individual precinct are treated alike, using the same voting methods
under the same rules. The rules for casting and counting votes apply the same to each candidate
in the individual precincts ...... Id., slip op. at 10, reprinted in Record at 56, Hendon.
38. "It is the duty of the indivdual voter to read and familiarize himself or herself with the
ballot instructions prior to casting his or her ballot." Id., slip op. at 15, reprinted in Record at 61,
Hendon.
39. Id., slip op. at 11, reprinted in Record at 57, Hendon.
40. Id., slip op. at 14, reprinted in Record at 60, Hendon.
41. Id., slip op. at 15, reprinted iz Record at 61, Hendon.
42. Specifically, the court noted the constitutional right to have one's vote counted as cast, the
strict scrutiny standard of review, and the compelling state interest requirement. Hendon, 710
F.2d at 180. See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
43. Id. at 180-81.
44. Melchoir v. Todman, 296 F. Supp. 900 (D.V.I. 1968); Murchie v. Clifford, 76 N.H. 99, 79
A. 901 (1911).
45. 296 F. Supp. 900 (D.V.I. 1968).
46. Id. at 901-02, citedin Hendon, 710 F.2d at 180.
47. 76 N.H. 99, 79 A. 901 (1911).
48. Id. at 101, 79 A. at 903, quotedin Hendon, 710 F. 2d at 180-81.
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"holding to the contrary has been called before our attention, '49 Hendon de-
clared the statute's classification discriminatory. Employing the district court's
three-part equal protection test, the court of appeals found that the character
of this discrimination, when combined with the strong individual interest in
the voting process, outweighed any state interest.50 Furthermore, the court
found that the state's interest was not compelling, but "arbitrary."5' 1 The court
of appeals remanded the case to the district court to determine a counting
procedure to replace the automatic straight-party vote and noted that either a
rule voiding the vote on that office ("neutralization" method of counting) or a
rule automatically giving the vote to the specifically voted individual candi-
date ("individual vote controls" method) would be constitutional.52
The appellate court also examined the other two statutes challenged. The
statute requiring voters seeking to split tickets to cast individual ballots for
each candidate was found to be facially constitutional, but was remanded for a
reexamination by the district court of its constitutional validity as applied.53
Recognizing the equal protection problems of varying the difficulty of casting
split-ticket votes with the type of machine used, the court of appeals declared
that the statute would be unconstitutional as applied if the State were unable
to show that the means used were the least burdensome to voters seeking to
split their ticket or that some rational state interest justified an added
burden.5 4
The court then examined the violations of the technical requirements of
the third statute.55 Because the violations were caused by "simple negligence"
rather than an intentional effort to erode the voting process and because there
was "no evidence of confusion or deception," the failure to provide a sample
ballot in one county and instructions in bold-face type in others did not
amount to a denial of due process. 56
Thus, the court of appeals declared the first statute (counting) unconstitu-
tional, reserved judgment on the constitutionality of the second (procedure for
splitting tickets) as applied, and held the technical violations of the third stat-
ute insufficient to raise a constitutional question. The court refused to grant
Hendon the injunctive relief desired, however, stating that limiting election
remedies to prospective relief was justified because plaintiff had foregone an
opportunity to challenge the constitutionality of the statutes before the elec-
tion.57 A contrary decision would "permit, if not encourage," every candidate
to gamble on his election and challenge the statute only if he lost the
49. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 180.
50. Id. at 180-81. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
51. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 180.
52. Id. at 183.
53. Id. at 181.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 182 (examining the application of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-140 (1983)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
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Despite the Hendon court's belief that the legislative branch should not
control how ballots are counted,5 9 it is evident that North Carolina's General
Assembly has done so for at least fifty years.60 The current statute, enacted in
1955,61 may have been enacted specifically to tighten the majority party's con-
trol in the representative bodies.62
Election law is by its very nature political. Although some rules of elec-
tion law are so self-evident that they may be politically neutral,63 most voting
regulations will either help or hinder certain candidates.64 It should not be
surprising that members of state legislatures vote out of self-interest when reg-
ulating election tabulations.
Adoption of the "straight-party-vote-controls" counting statute in 1955
appears to have been an example of self-interested voting by majority party
legislators. North Carolina originally followed the common-law majority
rule,65 which "neutralized" votes for offices on which a ballot was marked
both for one candidate through a straight-party vote and for a competing can-
didate individually.66 The rule was codified in the early statutes governing
elections.67 In 1939, however, North Carolina amended its voting laws to pro-
vide that such dual votes would be counted for the individually marked candi-
date.68 It is difficult to discern why the 1939 individual-vote-controls statute
was passed, except perhaps to make it easier for voters to mark their individ-
ual choices. 69 The supremacy of the democratic party through the 1940s 70 no
doubt helped downplay the statute's political significance.
It is less difficult to determine the reasons for the enactment of the current
statute in 1955. The 1952 reelection of a Republican in North Carolina's
Tenth Congressional District following a campaign in which he demonstrated
the ease with which tickets could be split caused some consternation among
Democrats and prompted the introduction of the straight-party-vote-controls
58. Id.
59. See supra text accompanying note 48.
60. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 165, § 23, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 145, 172-74.
61. Act of May 4, 1955, ch. 812, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 750.
62. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., G. MCCRARY, supra note 3, § 692, at 501 (describing the rapid passage of state
secret ballot laws once the idea was imported from Australia in the 1880s).
64. Perhaps the most glaring example of election laws which help majority party candidates
is the territorial lines drawn in redistricting'plans. Legislators are acutely aware that these laws
benefit the majority party, and voting on redistricting plans historically is split along party lines.
65. See G. McCRARY, supra note 3, § 532, at 395.
66. Plaintiff's Brief at 6, Hendon (citing 1928 sample ballot).
67. Act of Mar. 20, 1933, ch. 165, § 23, 1933 N.C. Sess. Laws 145, 172-74.
68. Act of Mar. 16, 1939, ch. 116, § 2, 1939 N.C. Sess. Laws 131, 131-32.
69. Although one could argue that the passage of this act in a General Assembly controlled
by the Democratic Party would contradict the idea that politicians vote on election laws out of
self-interest, the partisan circumstances surrounding the passage of its replacement as soon as the
law was seen to affect election results mitigates this argument.
70. Trilling & Harkins, The Growth of Parly Competition in North Carolina, in POLITICS AND
POLICY IN NORTH CAROLINA 82 (1975) (Republicans had no hope of directly influencing state
politics through the 1940s).
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bill.7 1 Although North Carolina does not maintain an official legislative his-
tory, newspaper accounts published in 1955 indicate the strong partisan nature
of the bill's enactment.72 The bill was entitled, "An act to . . .simplify and
clarify the procedure to be followed in voting a split ticket," 73 but it did much
more than simplify and clarify existing law. Passage of the bill reversed the
existing law and made North Carolina's vote-counting procedures unique
among the various state methods. 74
Despite the potential of voting and counting procedures to influence elec-
tions, legislatures have been able to retain control over these procedures be-
cause courts traditionally have refrained from reviewing election laws.
Election law challenges have been considered political questions and, there-
fore, inappropriate for judicial review.75 Placing the conclusory label "polit-
ical" on an issue does not reduce its legal significance; the need for protection
of minority political interests continues. Nevertheless, the political question
rationale has been used "to prevent review of a multitude of political sins."'76
Such deference to self-interested legislative bodies is particularly surprising
given the fundamental nature of the right to vote.77
Unfortunately, the district court and the court of appeals continued to
cling to the doctrine of judicial restraint and returned control over counting
and voting procedures to the legislative branch. The district court used the
political question rationale to support its statutory presumption of validity de-
spite doubts concerning the statute's wisdom. Although the court of appeals
declared unconstitutional the statute preferring straight-party counting, it did
so in part because it had not been shown contrary precedent,78 which did in
fact exist.79 If the court of appeals in Hendon had known about these contrary
cases, it might have used their holdings to justify an exercise of judicial re-
straint, even though the cases generally were outdated. In addition, even
71. Charlotte Observer, May 3, 1955, at 8A, col. 2, reprinted in Record at 113, Hendon.
72. See, e.g., Charlotte Observer, May 3, 1955, at 8A, col. 2 (Republican representative criti-
cizing bill as depriving voters of voting their intentions), reprinted in Record at I 11, 113, Hendon;
Raleigh News & Observer, Apr. 9, 1955, at 10, col. 5 (article titled "Democrats Act to Plug up
Political Leak").
73. Act of May 4, 1955, ch. 812, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 750.
74. North Carolina is the only state that counts crossover votes for the straight-party candi-
date. According to a survey by the Council of State Governments, 21 states statutorily provide for
straight party voting. THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1982-83 at 104. Of those states, all but North
Carolina count the specific vote over the general party vote. See Plaintiff's Brief at 5, Hendon
(statutes from all 20 other states digested). Other states that do not govern statutorily straight-
party voting presumably follow the common-law "neutralization" counting method. See supra
notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
75. See R. CLAUDE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 1 (1970) (from
1944 to 1969 the Supreme Court ruled on more election-related cases than it had in the previous
century); Note, Minority Party Access to the Ballot, 1971 DUKE L.J. 451, 451.
76. Comment, The Application of Constitutional Provisions to Political Parties, 40 TENN, L.
REv. 217, 228 (1973).
77. See supra note 1
78. See supra text accompanying note 49.
79. See, e.g., Snowden v. Flanery, 159 Ky. 568, 575-76, 167 S.W. 893, 897 (1914); In re Mead
Township Election, II Pa. D. 451,451 (1901); Gainer v. Dunn, 29 R.I. 239, 242-44, 69 A. 851, 852-
53 (1908).
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though it determined that North Carolina's counting statute was unconstitu-
tional, the court suggested two alternate methods of counting crossover ballots.
The court's failure to delineate a specific replacement counting method meant
that the legislature's control over ballot counting had not been removed, but
only limited. Although the choice of counting methods was remanded to the
district court, the legislature could control its decision by enacting its preferred
choice of the two alternatives.
The court of appeals also used the doctrine ofjudicial restraint in uphold-
ing the voting procedure statute, even though it imposed an added burden on
split-ticket voters. The court stated that, even if the statute were discrimina-
tory, it would be justified if a rational (rather than a compelling) state interest
existed.80 The court also noted that judicial restraint was a factor in its failure
to order a recount despite the fact that the unconstitutional statute may have
affected the election.8'
The court's refusal to grant injunctive relief82 is most justifiable on
grounds of judicial restraint, because "few remedial measures. . . cut quite as
deeply to the core of both federalism and representative government" as fed-
eral court invalidation of state elections.8 3 Although an unconstitutional stat-
ute's effect on an election's outcome has been suggested as the most
appropriate instance for federal court intervention,8 4 filing suit in a timely
manner consistently has been a prerequisite to federal court consideration of
invalidation as a remedy.8 5 Had Hendon challenged the statute prior to the
election, he probably would have been granted a recount.
The Hendon court's exercise ofjudicial restraint with regard to the consti-
tutionality of the voting-procedure statute is less justifiable. The court re-
manded the case to the district court for a determination of the statute's
constitutionality as applied, noting that the procedure least burdensome to
voters should be used unless an overriding state interest exists. 86 The court
qualified that standard in two ways. First, it noted that the least restrictive
system would not be required if the State demonstrated a "rational" justifica-
tion for an alternate system.8 7 By requiring merely a "rational" rather than a
"compelling" state interest, the court implied that the least restrictive system
80. Athough a compelling state interest is required .to meet the strict scrutiny standard of
facial unconstitutionality, the voting procedure statute was upheld as facially constitutional. See
supra text accompanying note 53. Thus, a rationality standard was found to be sufficient to prove
the constitutionality of the statute as applied.
g1. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 182.
82. Id.
83. Starr, Federal Judicial Invalidation as a Remedy for Irregularities in State Elections, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1092, 1095 (1974).
84. Id. at 1128.
85. Id. at 1111-14. Although admitting that strict adherence to the timeliness of the filing
prerequisite "may seem incongruous or unduly harsh at first blush," Professor Starr believes that
it is fair to deny plaintiffs injunctive relief when the only reason such an extraordinary remedy is
necessary is because of a "lack of industry" by the plaintiff. Id. at 1113. Starr makes an exception
when the illegality of the challenged provision cannot be determined prior to the election despite
due diligence, id., a situation not present in Hendon.
86. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 181.
87. Id.
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generally would not be imposed on an uncooperative legislature.88 Second,
the court implied that, at most, the State might be required to alter its ma-
chines to count all votes in the same manner, but could not be required to alter
them to count all votes in the manner least restrictive to split-ticket voters.
The court, however, ignored the fact that the neutralization method of count-
ing is inherently more burdensome to straight-ticket voters than the individ-
ual-vote-controls method, and suggested both as legitimate alternatives. The
court's approval of the neutralization method of counting indicates that the
voting procedure need not be the least burdensome system to split-ticket voters
as long as the extra burdens are borne equally in each precinct.
The Hendon court not only declined to examine the differing burdens of
the two proposed counting methods, but also left to the "sound discretion of
the district court" the task of determining which method was preferable.8 9
Both methods, however, are insufficient to protect the constitutional rights of
candidates.
The general theory supporting the individual-vote-controls method of
counting is that the specific intent enunciated by the voter should control over
his general intent. This theory "would appear to recognize the intent of the
voter,"90 especially given the general principle that a ballot should be con-
strued as effective to cast a valid vote whenever possible.91 The individual-
vote-controls theory has been implemented without problems in other states92
and, perhaps most importantly, is the least burdensome method to split-ticket
voters, who need only mark their exceptions to a straight-party vote to have all
of their votes counted as intended.
This same advantage also makes the theory politically unpalatable. A
system allowing stray marks to count for straight-party opponents invariably
will be opposed by beneficiaries of straight-party votes. Just as the 1939 indi-
vidual-vote-controls statute was replaced by Democrats in 1955 with a
straight-party-vote-controls statute, judicial adoption of an individual-vote-
controls method probably would invite Democratic challenge. This group
would prefer a neutralization method of counting, which at least voids the
stray votes for straight-party opponents. Because the neutralization method of
counting apparently was declared constitutionally permissible by Hendon, its
enactment by the legislature would prevent or override district court adoption
of the individual-vote-controls method.
The theory underlying the neutralization method of counting is that the
crossover voter has cast more votes than he was allowed for a particular office;
88. Id.
89. Id. at 183.
90. Id.
91. G. MCCRARYSupra note 3, § 530, at 393-94 n.2. Because the voter did not intend to vote
for more than the allowed number of candidates, reconciliation of his conflicting marks should be
attempted to discern his true intent. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-170 (1982): "No official
ballot shall be rejected because of technical errors in marking unless it is impossible to determine
the voter's choice." (emphasis added). By this analysis "neutralization" should be used only as a
last resort.
92. See supra note 74.
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therefore, his vote must be voided.9 3 The cases followed by Hendon both im-
plemented the neutralization counting method in place of the straight-party-
vote-controls statutes declared unconstitutional. 94 The neutralization count-
ing method has strong mathematical appeal because it favors neither candi-
date. Another argument favoring neutralization of ambiguous votes is that
courts should not endeavor to determine voter intent when it cannot be known
with any reasonable degree of certainty.95
Unfortunately, the neutralization theory places an added burden on split-
ticket voters.96 The neutralization method of counting, like the straight-party-
vote-controls method, allows split-tickets only if the voter makes a separate
mark for each candidate. 97 When a large number of offices are included on
the ballot, requiring individual votes for each candidate imposes an unneces-
sary burden on split-ticket voters and is a statutory incentive to vote a straight-
party ticket.
This incentive is heightened by the five minute limit on time spent in the
voting booth when others are waiting.98 Statutes requiting individual votes
for each candidate may be unduly burdensome because they "require the
voter to deal with substantial numbers of partisan races. . . in addition to the
non-partisan choices and other local votes in a maximum of 300 seconds." 99
Studies have confirmed that time limits discourage split-ticket voting when
individual selection of candidates is required. 1°° Facing "long and compli-
93. For example, by voting for the party candidate as well as a crossover individual, a voter
would have cast too many votes in an election in which only one candidate was to be elected.
94. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 181 n.4.
95. This argument assumes that the voter's intent was just as likely to have been to cast his
ballot for the straight-party candidate as for the separately aligned individual. Defendant's Brief
at 5-6, Hendon (presumption should be that voter understood instructions).
96. Hendon, 710 F.2d at 181. The court noted that split-ticket voting was easy in counties
using the mechanical lever machine and its individual-vote-controls method of counting, whereas
it was quite difficult in Airmac and CES districts, where split-ticket voters had to vote individually
from 41 to 54 times (depending on the county in which they resided). If all three machines were
programmed to use the neutralization method of counting, the disparity between counties would
disappear, but the disparity in the ease of voting between straight-party and split-ballot voters
would persist.
The significance of this difference is illustrated by the Hendon election. Voters in Rutherford
County who wished to vote for every Democrat except Hendon's opponent were forced to mark 54
spaces on the ballot (53 Democratic spaces and Hendon's space) because Rutherford County's
CES machine counted ballots using the straight-party-controls method. Fifty-four marks would
also have been required to get all votes counted if Rutherford County had used the neutralization
method. Under the individual-vote-controls method of counting, however, the crossover voter
would have had to make only two marks, one in the Democratic party circle and one beside
Hendon. Thus, the latter clearly is the least restrictive method to split-ticket voters.
97. Under both the neutralization theory and the straight-party-vote-controls theory, once
the voter marks the straight-party circle he has exhausted his right to vote for other candidates.
98. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-150 (1982). See Plaintiff's Brief at 16, Hendon. The "time fac-
tor" issue was excluded properly from consideration by the court of appeals, as it had not been
raised at the district court level. Defendant's Brief at 8 n. 1, Hendon. On remand, however, it may
be possible for the district court to consider this interesting and important argument. The legisla-
ture should examine closely the time-factor issue's effect on split-ticket voting in drafting a re-
placement counting statute.
99. Plaintiff's Brief at 16, Hendon.
100. In the Ohio Democratic primary election of 1972, "'[tlhe option of individual voting [for
delegates] was virtually ignored,'" with voters choosing slates of candidates. Even well-known
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cated ballots, . . . the voter, under [general] state law, is often allowed no
more than three minutes or so to record his decisions. Under these conditions,
it is easy to understand why voters take the path of least resistance."101
In North Carolina, the five minute rule apparently is not being strictly
enforced.' 0 2 Enforcement of the rule, however, is not the only burden placed
on voters. The rule is listed in the North Carolina Precinct Manual 0 3 and its
mere publication to voters by poll workers may have a chilling effect on their
desire to vote individually. Just as important is the potential for abuse if the
five minute rule were to be enforced more strictly.
Despite the clear incentive against split-ticket voting inherent in the neu-
tralization counting method, Hendon affirmed its constitutionality. Thus, neu-
tralization of crossover votes remains a viable alternative to the statute
declared unconstitutional in Hendon. The best system of counting votes, how-
ever, would be a "striking" system, under which votes for crossover candidates
are counted only if the voter affirmatively strikes through (votes against) the
crossover candidate's straight-party opponent. 1°4 With more complex voting
machines, on which striking through a name is impossible, additional levers or
circles could be provided on the right side of a candidate's name for affirma-
tive votes against the candidate. The striking procedure would use both count-
ing methods proposed by the Hendon court, with the individual vote
controlling if the straight-party vote were crossed out for that particular office,
and the votes neutralized if it were not.
The proposed striking system would avoid the unduly burdensome re-
quirements of individual split-ticket voting inherent in the neutralization
method of counting, but would require a voter to demonstrate clearly his in-
tent to depart from the straight-party ticket in individual races. The striking
method of counting is only slightly more burdensome than the individual-
vote-controls counting method and provides little room for arguing that a
political leaders failed to draw significant individual votes due to time restrictions. COUNCIL OF
STATE Gov'Ts, MODERNIZING ELECTION SYSTEMS 27 (1973) (quoting OFFICE OF FED. ELEC-
TIONS, A STUDY OF ELECTION DIFFICULTIES IN REPRESENTATIVE AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS: Fi-
NAL REPORT (1973)).
101. Id. at 27.
102. Defendant's Brief at 17-18, Hendon (affidavit of Executive Secretary-Director of the
North Carolina Board of Elections stated that he has "instructed all county elections officers that
the five-minute voting time. . . shall not be strictly adhered to" and that it has not been imposed
on a voter since a deliberate attempt to stall the voting process in 1968).
103. H. TURNBULL, PRECINCT MANUAL/1974 at 60 (1974).
104. Striking through a party candidate's name and voting for his opponent has been judi-
dally determined to illustrate the voter's intent to vote for the latter, see, e.g., Tuthill v. Rendle-
man, 387 Ill. 321, 56 N.E.2d 375 (1944) (opposing write-in candidate); Johnstun v. Harrison, 114
Utah 94, 197 P.2d 470 (1948); Frantz v. Hansen, 104 Utah 412, 140 P.2d 631 (1943) (opposing
party candidate). It, however, has not been codified or incorporated as a specific voting system, as
is suggested by this note.
Even in the absence of formal adoption of the striking system, split-ticket voters in paper
ballot districts are likely to be able to use the method to give effect to their crossover votes. Al-
though paper ballot straight-party votes in 1982 did not negate crossover votes for Hendon, they
did negate crossover votes for candidates for lower offices. Striking would ensure that these indi-
vidual votes were counted. For other types of ballots, however, the striking system would be
unavailable absent its express incorporation as a specific voting system.
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crossover voter cast his individual votes unintentionally. Although not per-
fect,105 the striking system could provide a workable compromise between the
interests and concerns of majority and minority parties.
GREGORY STUART SMITH
105. The proposed striking system still would void crossover ballots lacking a strike through
the straight party candidate who is opposing the individually marked candidate. This result may
be contrary to voter intent. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 93-
95 and accompanying text.
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